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RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-Prohibition of Branch Banking-School Savings Plan as
Branch Banking-[Illinois].-The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the promotion
of school savings systems, contracted with the defendant bank, in consideration for a
fixed sum, to install and maintain such a program in certain public schools. The plan
involved the opening of student accounts, the acceptance of deposits by the teachers,
and the collection of such deposits by the defendant's messenger. Finding the arrange-
ment unprofitable, the defendant discontinued the plan before the time stipulated in
the contract. On appeal from a judgment awarding the plaintiff contract damages,
held, reversed. The contract violated the Illinois statute prohibiting branch banking,,
and was therefore ultra vires. Thrift, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co.2
That the court was justified in declaring the contract ultra ires and, therefore,
unenforceable because of an Illinois statute prohibiting branch banking3 seems unlikely
in view of the fact that apparently neither counsel called the court's attention to a
statute which sanctions school savings arrangements by Illinois banks.4 Had this
statute been given consideration, damages for breach of the contract would doubtless
have been allowed.
The Illinois statute prohibiting branch banking is admittedly explicit, but, it is
submitted, was not intended to outlaw school savings systems. The statute expressly
forbids any bank from receiving deposits or cashing checks in any place other than the
corporate charter situs and from having any other "banking house," "agency,"
"branch office," or "branch bank."s This and similar statutes6 have been adopted
because of the many objections to branch banking. It is maintained that branch bank-
ing prevents adequate supervision and inspectionj encourages absentee control,s ag-
gravates disturbances in the whole banking system, 9 and results in concentration of
financial resources and the disappearance of the independent banker."' These objec-
tions, however, do not apply to a school savings system. Such a plan requires but little
1 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. x6, § 9.
298 Ill. App. 5oI, 19 N.E. (2d) 126 (z939).
3 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. i6j, § 9.
4 Smith-Hurd's IM. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. i6 , § x6.
s Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 16j, § 9.
6 See Fordham, Branch Banking as Separate Entities, 3i Col. L. Rev. 975 (193r) for state
branch banking legislation. Cf. State ex rel. Barrett v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S.W.
619 (1923) which held that a state may prohibit national banking branches; 44 Stat. 1228
(1927), 48 Stat. i89, 190 (1933), 49 Stat. 708 (1935), 12 U.S.C.A. § 36 (1936).
7 Fordham, op. cit. supra note 6, at 977.
8 Collins, The Branch Banking Question 9 (1926); 2 Zollman, Banks and Banking § 1292
(1936). See also Willis, Branch Banking, 2 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 679, 68o (1930).
9 Brink, Branch or Chain Banking-Its Effect on the Community, 35 Com. L. League J.
z88, 19o (i93o).
10 Collins, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8.
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additional supervision, inasmuch as a separate bookkeeping system is not needed.IX
Absentee control is dangerous only where widely-separated, independent banking
units are involved, a situation non-existent in a school savings system.'2 Nor should
the fear of monopoly or of the disappearance of the independent banker be of any con-
cern; student banking comprises but a small part of total bank deposits,'s and con-
sequently deprives competing banks of little or no business. Thus, no main objection
to branch banking4 is applicable to a school savings system.s Nor would the express
provision prohibiting the acceptance of deposits at a place other than the bank 6 seem
to apply to school savings, for such a provision was undoubtedly designed to prevent
the development of city-wide branch banking, allegedly the forerunner of state-wide
operations.7
Failure of the branch banking statute to prohibit school savings plans, however,
does not sanction such arrangements. Banks, being affected with a public interest,18
may exercise no powers not clearly given by the constitution, statute, or corporate
charter;9 silence or failure clearly to prohibit is not tantamount to authorization. But
Illinois law is not silent on this question. The statute prohibiting private banking ex-
pressly states that nothing within that Act shall be construed to prevent banks in-
corporated under Illinois or federal law from having agents receive savings deposits
"in and through the public schoos. ' 2o Thus, although the act does not affirmatively
provide for school savings, the legislature has, by explicit exception, unequivocally
given its approval to such plans.
It is submitted, furthermore, that even if the branch banking statute were intended
to prohibit school savings, such plans may be adopted by Illinois banks. The act
prohibiting private banking, which contains the clause allowing school savings by
express exception, was passed after the branch banking statute." Thus, if the two
", American Bankers Ass'n, School Savings Banking 120 et seq. (1923) illustrating the
accounting system.
"2The absentee control criticism is aimed at branch banking as a state-wide activity. See
Marvin v. Kentucky Title and Trust Co., 218 Ky. 135, 291 S.W. 17 (1927).
'3 In 1927 school savings deposits amounted to only 39 million dollars, while all deposits
totaled 32,063 million dollars. See Murphey, Thrift through Education (z929); The World
Almanac 298 (1938).
'4 See Cartinhour, Branch, Group and Chain Banking 298 et seq. (1931) for a discussion of
the objections to branch banking.
Xs See In re Commissioner of Banks, Mass. Att'y-Gen. Rep. 276 (1922) where it was held
that a school savings arrangement was not a "branch office" within the Massachusetts statute
prohibiting trust companies from having branch offices.
16 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 16j, § 9.
17 Collins, op. ci. sup a, note 8, at ii.
IS Bruner v. Citizens Bank, 134 Ky. 283, 293, 120 S.W. 345, 348 (I909); Bank of Italy v.
Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 12, 251 Pac. 784, 788 (1926).
9 Knass v. Madison and Kedzie Bank, 354 Ill. 554, x88 N.E. 836 (1933); Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Trust & Savings Bank, 366 Ill. 366, 9 N.E. (2d) 53 (1937).
2o Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 16j, § z6.
"1 The act prohibiting branch banking was passed in 1923 and approved by referendum
in 1924, Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Ann. Stat. 1934 c. 16j, § 9. Section x6 on private banking
passed in 1929 and accepted by the electorate in i93o supersedes an act of 19r9 which con-
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laws cannot be reconciled, the later will repeal the earlier to the extent of allowing
school savings plans.22 In any event, whether the acts be deemed consistent or in-
compatible, the decision in the instant case appears to be dearly wrong.
Bankruptcy-Reorganization-Jurisdiction and Discretion under Section 7 7B
and Chapter X To Proceed by Summary Process in Collection of Pledged Assets-
[Federal].-The debtor assigned and pledged certain accounts receivable to the com-
plaining creditor. In some instances the same accounts were assigned to two or more
creditors. Proceedings were then instituted under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy
Act. By order of the district court, in a summary Proceeding,' the trustee was directed
to notify all debtors whose debts were assigned to pay their indebtedness to the trustee,
who was to deduct one and one-half percent for "collection charges" and keep the
sums collected in separate accounts to await final disposition. The creditor-pledgee of
the accounts receivable objected to the jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed sum-
marily. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that under Section 77B the debtor's uncon-
tested property interest in the accounts receivable was sufficient to give the reorganiza-
tion court summary jurisdiction. In re Moulding-Brownell Corp.-National Builders
Bank of Chicago v. Schwartz.2
The decision is a recognition of the broadened summary jurisdiction conferred by
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.3 Since in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, pos-
session by the court is the basis of the court's power over the debtor's property,4 the as-
sertion of an adverse claim to possession may necessitate a plenary suits to collect the
assets of the debtor's estate. In reorganization proceedings, however, the reorganiza-
tion court is vested by Section 77B (a) with complete and paramount control of the
tained the identical clause as to school savings. One section of this prior act had been held
unconstitutional in Wedesweiler v. Brundage, 297 Ill. 228, 13o N.E. 520 (1921), but this sec-
tion has been omitted from the amended statute.
22 Ayres v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, 247, 87 N.E. 1073, 1076 (igog); City of Decatur v.
German, 31o Ill. 591, 142 N.E. 252 (1924); People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 312, 178 N.E. 133,
143 (193x).
x"A summary proceeding is one begun by petition and notice of motion or by order to
show cause. The court may make its determination upon proof by affidavit or upon testimony
at a hearing; upon short notice or ex pare. The determination and trial of issues by formal
pleadings has no place in a summary proceeding." 2 Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations
§ 849 (1936).
2 Jor F. (2d) 664 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
3 48 Stat. 912 (1934), xi U.S.C.A. § 207 (1938). The amendment and incorporation of § 77B
into Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act probably does not diminish the summary jurisdiction
of the reorganization court for if anything the provisions of Chapter X would seem to extend
the court's power.
4 Wabash Ry. v. Adelbert College, 2o8 U.S. 38, 53 (i9o8); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v.
Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. i (igoi); May v. Henderson,
268 U.S. 111 (1925); Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 19i (1926).
5 "If a proceeding is treated as a suit in equity, with formal pleadings and amendments, and
full opportunity for the presentation and cross-examination of witnesses is given at the trial,
the proceeding is plenary rather than summary, even though begun by petition and notice of
motion or by order to show cause." 2 Gerdes, op. cit. supra note i, at § 849.
